By Walter Dellinger, from Slate, writing on the role of public opinion in Supreme Court decision-making:
...It was not a mere coincidence that when the court stuck down homosexual sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas in
2003, the number of states that still had such laws was about the same
as the number of states that still had de jure school segregation when Brown
was decided—in each case, the retrograde states made up about
one-fourth of the country. In contrast, when the court sustained state
laws banning the use of lethal medication in Washington v. Glucksberg, the rejected claim of a right to physician-assisted suicide had not yet been recognized by even a single state.
What
makes these questions so timely is that David Souter ... addressed these issues in a
very powerful way just [before leaving the Court] in an passage that may well have been
intended as a valedictory message to the court and a caution to those
who litigate on behalf of individual liberty. In his dissent in the DNA
case, District Attorney's Office v. Osborne,
Souter wrote extensively about issues of substantive liberty that he
did not need to address in order to decide the case before him. He
obviously had some things he really wanted to say before hanging up his
black robe.
In his
essay-within-an-opinion, Souter clearly had the sweep of the court's
future in mind, and not just any single issue. It is still hard to
avoid the conclusion that one issue in his mind was gay marriage. His
carefully nuanced message both defends the legitimacy of judicial
recognition of "non-traditional" rights and cautions against a
premature quest for national judicial rules.
Souter,
recognizing the value of "continuity with the past," accepts the
proposition that tradition is a "serious consideration" in judging
whether a practice is "outside the realm of reasonable governmental
action." He rejects, however, the notion that tradition defines and
limits the scope of the liberties entitled to judicial protection
against hostile legislation.
A true originalist, Souter refuses to limit individual rights to the time-bound set of liberties that the Framers of the 14th
Amendment would have include had they chosen to adopt a specific list.
The short answer is that the Framers did not so choose. They
deliberately wrote with a broad brush and left particular applications
to the future. In carrying out that mandate, Souter writes, the court
must look to "widely shared understandings within the national society"
that can change "as interests claimed under the rubric of liberty
evolve into recognition."
Having defended
the concept of evolving liberty, Souter then turns to the important
question of when it would be "premature for the Judicial Branch to
decide whether … a general right should be recognized."
"The
beginning of wisdom," he writes, "is to go slow." Before declaring
"unsympathetic state or national laws arbitrary to the point of being
unconstitutional," he writes, a wise court will "recognize how much
time society needs in order to work through a given issue."
His opinion then takes what seems to be an extraordinarily personal turn. He
may be speaking of himself (or his rural neighbors) when his says that
"[w]e can change our own inherited views just so fast, and a person is
not labeled a stick-in-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral
claim without having some time to work through it intellectually and
emotionally." Sometimes, he says, "an attachment to the familiar and
the limits of experience" limit "an individual's capacity to see the
potential legitimacy of a moral position."
So,
too, it is with the broader society, which "needs the chance to take
part in the dialectic of public and political back and forth about a
new liberty claim." Souter's final message to his conservative
colleagues is that conceptions of liberty evolve. And his last caution
to those litigators pushing the frontiers of liberty is that nations,
like individuals, need time to assimilate new thinking....
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